Popular matchings in the weighted capacitated house allocation problem  by Sng, Colin T.S. & Manlove, David F.
Journal of Discrete Algorithms 8 (2010) 102–116Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Discrete Algorithms
www.elsevier.com/locate/jda
Popular matchings in the weighted capacitated house allocation
problem✩
Colin T.S. Sng 1, David F. Manlove ∗,2
Department of Computing Science, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, UK
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Received 7 January 2008
Accepted 29 November 2008
Available online 24 July 2009
Keywords:
Popular matching problem
Priorities
Strict preference lists
Maximum popular matching
Polynomial-time algorithm
We consider the problem of ﬁnding a popular matching in the Weighted Capacitated House
Allocation problem (WCHA). An instance of WCHA involves a set of agents and a set of
houses. Each agent has a positive weight indicating his priority, and a preference list in
which a subset of houses are ranked in strict order. Each house has a capacity that indicates
the maximum number of agents who could be matched to it. A matching M of agents to
houses is popular if there is no other matching M ′ such that the total weight of the agents
who prefer their allocation in M ′ to that in M exceeds the total weight of the agents who
prefer their allocation in M to that in M ′. Here, we give an O (
√
Cn1 + m) algorithm to
determine if an instance of WCHA admits a popular matching, and if so, to ﬁnd a largest
such matching, where C is the total capacity of the houses, n1 is the number of agents,
and m is the total length of the agents’ preference lists.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
An instance I of the Weighted Capacitated House Allocation problem (WCHA) involves a set of agents A = {a1,a2, . . . ,an1 }
and a set of houses H = {h1,h2, . . . ,hn2 }. Each agent a ∈ A ranks in strict order a subset of H (the acceptable houses for a)
represented by his preference list. We also create a unique last resort house l(a) for each a and append l(a) to a’s preference
list. Every agent a also has a positive weight w(a) indicating a’s priority, and we partition A into sets P1, P2, . . . , Pk , such
that the weight of agents in Pz is wz , and w1 > w2 > · · · > wk > 0. For each agent a ∈ A, we say that a has priority z if
a ∈ Pz , and we use P (a) to denote the priority of a. Each house h j ∈ H has a capacity c j  1 which indicates the maximum
number of agents that may be assigned to it.
The underlying graph of I is the bipartite graph G = (A, H∪ L, E), where L is the set of last resort houses, and E comprises
all pairs (a,h j) such that house h j appears in the preference list of agent a (note that this includes the pairs (a, l(a)) for
each agent a). We let n = n1 + n2 and m = |E|. We assume that mmax{n1,n2 + L}, i.e., no agent has an empty preference
list and each house is acceptable to at least one agent. We also assume that c j  n1 for each h j ∈ H . Let C =∑n2j=1 c j denote
the sum of the capacities of the houses.
A matching M in I is a subset of E such that (i) each agent is assigned to at most one house in M , and (ii) each house
h j ∈ H is assigned to at most c j agents in M . We say that a house h j ∈ H is full in M if |M(h j)| = c j , and undersubscribed
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M(h j) to be the set of agents matched to h j in M (thus M(h j) could be empty). Given two matchings M and M ′ in I , we
say that an agent a prefers M ′ to M if either (i) a is matched in M ′ and unmatched in M , or (ii) a is matched in both M ′
and M and prefers M ′(a) to M(a). Let P (M ′,M) denote the set of agents who prefer M ′ to M . Then, the satisfaction of M ′
with respect to M is deﬁned as sat(M ′,M) =∑a∈P (M′,M) w(a)−∑a∈P (M,M′) w(a). We say that M ′ is more popular than M if
sat(M ′,M) > 0. A matching M in I is popular if there is no other matching in I that is more popular than M .
Motivation
WCHA is an example of a bipartite matching problem with one-sided preferences [1,2,10,3]. These problems have appli-
cations in areas such as campus housing allocation in US universities [1], hence the problem name; in assigning probationary
teachers to their ﬁrst posts in Scotland; and in Amazon’s DVD rental service. The assignment of weights to agents allows
us to build up a spectrum of priority levels for them in the competition for houses in situations where the total capacity of
the houses is less than the number of agents. In turn, this gives some agents a better chance of “doing well”. For instance,
the assignment of weights can enable DVD rental companies like Amazon to give priority to those members who have paid
more for privileged status whenever a certain title is limited in stock. Alternatively, weights may be assigned to candidates
in job markets based on objective criteria such as academic results or relevant work experience.
A variety of optimality criteria have been deﬁned for bipartite matching problems with one-sided preferences. Gärdenfors
[8] ﬁrst introduced the notion of a popular matching (referring to this concept as a majority assignment) in the context
of the Stable Marriage problem. We remark that the more popular than concept can be traced back even further to the
Condorcet voting protocol. Alternatively, Pareto optimality [1,2] is often regarded by economists as a fundamental property
to be satisﬁed. A matching M is Pareto optimal if there is no matching M ′ such that some agent prefers M ′ to M , and no
agent prefers M to M ′ . Clearly a popular matching is Pareto optimal. Finally, a matching is rank-maximal [10] if it assigns
the maximum number of agents to their ﬁrst-choice houses, and subject to this, the maximum number of agents to their
second-choice houses, and so on. However, Pareto optimal matchings and rank-maximal matchings need not be popular.
Previous work
Popular matchings were ﬁrst considered from an algorithmic point of view by Abraham et al. [3] in the context of
the House Allocation problem (HA) – the special case of WCHA where each house has capacity 1 and each agent has the
same priority. They gave an instance of HA in which no popular matching exists and also noted that popular matchings
can have different sizes. The authors also formulated an O (n + m) algorithm for ﬁnding a maximum cardinality popular
matching (henceforth a maximum popular matching) if one exists, given an instance of HA. They also described an O (
√
nm)
algorithm for the case where preferences may include ties, i.e., HA with Ties (HAT).
Several other papers have also focused on popular matchings. Chung [6] considered popular matchings in instances of the
Stable Roommates problem (a non-bipartite generalisation of HA) and noted that a stable matching is popular, however the
same need not be true in the presence of ties. In the HA context, Mahdian [13] showed that a popular matching exists with
high probability when (i) preference lists are random, and (ii) the number of houses is a small multiplicative factor larger
than the number of agents. In the context of HAT, Abraham and Kavitha [4] considered voting paths in relation to popular
matchings in a dynamic matching market in which agents and houses can enter and leave the market. Manlove and Sng [14]
studied the Capacitated House Allocation problem (CHA) – this is the special case of WCHA in which all agents have the same
priority. They gave an O (
√
Cn1 +m) algorithm for ﬁnding a (maximum) popular matching, if one exists, when preferences
are strict, and an O ((
√
C +n1)m) algorithm when preferences contain ties. Mestre [17] studied the Weighted House Allocation
problem (WHA) – this is the special case of WCHA in which all houses have unitary capacity. He gave an O (n+m) algorithm
for ﬁnding a (maximum) popular matching, if one exists, when preferences are strict, and an O (min(k
√
n,n)m) algorithm
when preferences contain ties. Kavitha and Shah [12] gave an O (nω) randomised algorithm for ﬁnding a popular matching
or reporting that none exists, given an instance of HAT, where ω < 2.376 is the exponent of matrix multiplication.
To cope with the possible non-existence of a popular matching, McCutchen [15] deﬁned two notions of a matching
that is, in some sense, “as popular as possible”, namely a least-unpopularity-factor matching and a least-unpopularity-margin
matching, for instances of HA and HAT. McCutchen proved that computing either type of matching is NP-hard, even if
preference lists are strictly ordered. Huang et al. [9] gave an O (
√
nm) algorithm for ﬁnding a matching M with unpopularity
factor 2, provided that a certain graph admits a matching in which all agents are matched. They also generalised this result
by describing a sequence of graphs H2, H3, . . . , Hr such that if Hr admits a matching in which all agents are matched,
a matching M can be computed in O (r
√
nm) time with unpopularity factor at most r − 1 and unpopularity margin at most
n(1− 2r ).
Recently, Kavitha and Nasre [11] gave an O (n2 +m) algorithm for the problem of computing an optimal popular match-
ing (assuming a popular matching exists), given an instance of HA, where “optimal” includes the rank-maximal, fair (i.e.,
minimise the number of agents who obtain their rth choice house, and subject to this, minimise the number who obtain
their (r − 1)th choice, and so on, where r is the maximum length of an agent’s preference list) and minimum cost (i.e.,
minimise the sum of the ranks of the agents’ assigned houses in their preference lists) criteria. McDermid and Irving [16]
gave a characterisation of the set of popular matchings for an HA instance in terms of the so-called switching graph, which
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1: for all h j ∈ H do
2: for i in 1..k do
3: f i, j := 0;
4: end for
5: end for
6: for all a ∈ P1 do
7: f (a) := ﬁrst-ranked house h j on a’s preference list;
8: f1, j ++;
9: end for
10: for z in 2..k do
11: for all a ∈ Pz do
12: q := 1;
13: h j := house at position q on a’s preference list;
14: while (
∑z−1
p=1 f p, j  c j ) do
15: q ++;
16: h j := house at position q on a’s preference list;
17: end while
18: f (a) := h j ;
19: f z, j ++;
20: end for
21: end for
is computable in linear time from the preference lists. They showed that this structure can be exploited to yield eﬃcient
algorithms for a range of associated problems, including the counting and enumeration of the set of popular matchings,
generation of a popular matching uniformly at random, ﬁnding all (agent, house) pairs that can occur in a popular match-
ing, and computing popular matchings that satisfy various additional optimality criteria, including the rank-maximal, fair
and minimum cost criteria described above. The algorithm of McDermid and Irving [16] for computing a minimum cost
popular matching runs in O (n +m) time, whilst their algorithms for computing a rank-maximal or a fair popular match-
ing have O (n logn +m) complexity; each of these running times improves on that of Kavitha and Nasre [11] for the same
problems.
Our results
In this paper, we consider popular matchings in an instance I of WCHA (i.e., preference lists are strict), which is a
natural generalisation of the one-one WHA model. We give a non-trivial extension of the results from [17] to WCHA. We
ﬁrst develop in Section 2 necessary conditions for a matching to be popular in a WCHA instance I . Then, in Sections 3.1
and 3.2, we deﬁne a structure in the underlying graph of I that enables us to identify certain edges that cannot belong to
a popular matching, giving correctness proofs in Section 3.3. We then use these two results in conjunction to construct in
Section 3.4 an O (
√
Cn1 +m) time algorithm for ﬁnding a popular matching in I or reporting that none exists. In Section 3.5
we show how to modify this algorithm to compute a maximum popular matching if one exists, without altering the time
complexity. We remark that a straightforward solution to the problem of ﬁnding a maximum popular matching in I may be
to use “cloning”. Informally, this entails creating c j clones for each house h j to obtain an instance J of WHAT (WHA with
ties), and then applying the algorithm of [17] for WHAT to J . However, we will show in Section 3.6 that this approach leads
to a slower algorithm than our direct approach.
2. Characterising a popular matching
For each agent a ∈ A, we introduce the notion of a’s f -house and a’s s-house denoting these by f (a) and s(a) respectively.
Agent a prefers f (a) to s(a), and as we will show, these are the only two houses to which a could be matched in a popular
matching. We use Algorithm Label-f shown in Algorithm 1 to deﬁne f (a) precisely (the deﬁnition of s(a) will follow later
in this section.)
Here, we will deﬁne the f -houses for all the agents in phases, with each phase corresponding to a priority level Pz .
Intuitively, during the course of the algorithm’s execution, f i, j will denote the number of agents with priority i whose
f -house is deﬁned and equal to h j . Initially, f i, j = 0 for all i (1  i  k) and j (1  j  n2). We then deﬁne the f -house
for each agent as follows. For every agent a ∈ P1, we let f (a) be the ﬁrst-ranked house h j on a’s preference list, and we
call such a house an f1-house. Given 2 z  k, for every agent a ∈ Pz , we let f (a) be the most-preferred house h j on a’s
preference list such that
∑z−1
p=1 f p, j < c j – we call h j an f z-house. Clearly, the algorithm must terminate due to the presence
of a unique last resort house at the end of each agent’s preference list. Once the algorithm has terminated, we let f i(h j)
denote the set {a ∈ Pi: f (a) = h j}. Then, f i, j = | f i(h j)| (possibly f i, j = 0). Here, and henceforth throughout this paper, any
reference to f i, j refers to the value of this variable upon termination of Algorithm Label-f.
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a1: 1 7 h1 h2 h3 h1 1
a2: 2 4 h1 h3 h4 h2 2
a3: 2 4 h3 h5 h3 2
a4: 3 2 h3 h1 h4 h5 h4 2
a5: 3 2 h1 h4 h5 h5 1
a6: 3 2 h4 h1 h2
Fig. 1. An instance I1 of WCHA.
It is straightforward to verify that Algorithm Label-f runs in O (m) time if we use virtual initialisation (described in
[5, p. 149]) for the steps in lines 1–5. The example in Fig. 1 gives an illustration of the deﬁnition of f -houses. Here, the
f -houses of the agents are as follows: f (a1) = h1, f (a2) = h3, f (a3) = h3, f (a4) = h4, f (a5) = h4 and f (a6) = h4.
Now, for each h j ∈ H , let f (h j) = {a ∈ A : f (a) = h j} and f j = | f (h j)| (possibly f j = 0), i.e., f (h j) =⋃kp=1 f p(h j). Deﬁne
h j ∈ H to be an f-house if f j > 0. Clearly each h j may be an f z-house for more than one priority level z. For each h j ∈ H
such that f j > 0, let d j be a priority level deﬁned as follows:
d j =
{
max{r: 0 r  k ∧ fr, j > 0}, if f j  c j,
max{r: 0 r  k ∧∑ri=1 f i, j < c j}, if f j > c j.
Intuitively, if f j  c j then d j is the maximum priority level r such that f (a) = h j for some a ∈ Pr . If f j > c j then d j is
the maximum priority level r such that the total number of agents a satisfying f (a) = h j and P (a) r is less than c j . Note
that for every h j such that f j > c j , clearly
∑d j+1
i=1 f i, j  c j , so fd j+1, j > 0. However it is impossible that f i, j > 0 for some
i > d j + 1 by deﬁnition of an f -house. It follows that fd j+1, j > c j −
∑d j
i=1 f i, j .
We refer to Fig. 1 for illustration. Here, d1 = 1, d3 = 2 and d4 = 2. Note that d2 and d5 are not deﬁned, for h2 and h5 are
not f -houses for any agent. Also f3,4 > c4 − ( f1,4 + f2,4).
We now work towards obtaining a characterisation of popular matchings in WCHA. We begin with the following technical
lemma.
Lemma 1. Let M be a matching in a WCHA instance I . Let h j ∈ H be an f-house, and let 1  i  d j . Suppose h j is full in M and⋃i−1
p=1 f p(h j) ⊆ M(h j) but fi(h j) M(h j). Then M(h j)\
⋃i
p=1 f p(h j) 	= ∅.
Proof. Let F =⋃ip=1 f p(h j). Clearly, |F |∑d jp=1 f p, j  c j . Since |F\M(h j)| > 0, it follows that |M(h j)\F | = |M(h j)| − |F | +
|F\M(h j)| > 0. 
The next three lemmas contribute to the characterisation of popular matchings in WCHA.
Lemma 2. Let M be a popular matching in any given WCHA instance I and let a ∈ A be any agent. Then, a cannot be assigned to a
house better than f (a) in M.
Proof. Let a be an agent whose priority index is lowest (i.e., a has greatest weight and highest priority) such that a is
assigned to house h j in M and a prefers h j to f (a) = hl . Let a ∈ Pi so that ∑i−1p=1 f p, j  c j by deﬁnition of f (a) as a’s
f -house. Clearly, there must be no agent a′ such that a′ ∈ Pz where z  i and f (a′) = h j , for otherwise ∑z−1p=1 f p, j < c j ,
a contradiction. Let a′ be any agent with priority level z < i such that a′ ∈ f (h j)\M(h j) – there must exist such an agent
since
⋃k
p=i f p(h j) = ∅ and
∑i−1
p=1 f p, j  c j and a ∈ M(h j). Then, by choice of a, a′ is assigned in M to a house worse than
f (a′). However, this means that we can promote a′ to f (a′) and demote a to l(a) to obtain a matching whose improvement
in satisfaction is wz − wi > 0, a contradiction. 
Lemma 3. Let M be a popular matching in any given WCHA instance I . Then, for each f-house h j ∈ H,⋃d ji=1 f i(h j) ⊆ M(h j).
Proof. Given 1 i  d j , we will prove by induction on i that f i(h j) ⊆ M(h j).
For the base case, let i = 1. Suppose that f1(h j) M(h j). Then, there exists some agent ar ∈ f1(h j)\M(h j). By deﬁnition
of an f1-house, h j must be the ﬁrst house on ar ’s preference list. Hence, ar prefers to be assigned to h j than M(ar). Clearly,
if h j is undersubscribed in M , we can promote ar to h j to obtain a matching more popular than M , a contradiction. Hence,
h j is full in M . Choose any as ∈ M(h j)\ f1(h j) (which must exist by Lemma 1). Since as /∈ f1(h j), either (i) as has priority
> 1, or (ii) as has priority 1 but f (as) = hl 	= h j . In subcase (i), we can promote ar to h j and demote as to l(as) to obtain a
more popular matching. In subcase (ii), since f (as) = hl , it follows by Lemma 2 that as prefers to be assigned to hl than h j .
Now, if hl is undersubscribed in M , we can promote ar to h j and promote as to hl to obtain a more popular matching.
Hence, hl is full in M . If hl = M(ar), then we can then promote ar to h j and promote as to hl to obtain a more popular
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at to l(at) to obtain a matching whose improvement in satisfaction is w1 + w1 − w(at) > 0.
For the inductive case, assume that 2 i  d j , and if q < i, then fq(h j) ⊆ M(h j) for all h j ∈ H . Suppose for a contradiction
that f i(h j) M(h j). Then, there exists some ar ∈ f i(h j)\M(h j). Now, since f (ar) = h j , it follows by Lemma 2 that ar must
prefer to be assigned to h j than M(ar). Thus, if h j is undersubscribed in M , we can promote ar to h j to obtain a more
popular matching than M , a contradiction. Hence, h j is full in M . Choose any as ∈ M(h j)\⋃ip=1 f p(h j) which must exist by
Lemma 1. Since as /∈⋃ip=1 f p(h j), either (i) as has priority > i, or (ii) as has priority  i but f (as) = hl 	= h j .
In subcase (i), we can promote ar to h j and demote as to l(as) to obtain a more popular matching than M , a contra-
diction. In subcase (ii), suppose that as has priority z < i. Then hl is an f z-house so that as ∈ f z(hl). However, this is a
contradiction since by the inductive hypothesis f z(hl) ⊆ M(hl), but M(as) 	= hl . Thus, as has priority i and as ∈ f i(hl). Clearly,
since f (as) = hl , it follows by Lemma 2 that as must prefer to be assigned to hl than h j . Thus, if hl is undersubscribed, we
can promote ar to h j and promote as to hl to obtain a more popular matching than M , a contradiction. Hence hl is full. If
hl = M(ar), then we can promote ar to h j and promote as to hl to obtain a more popular matching. Otherwise, hl 	= M(ar).
We will show how to choose at ∈ M(hl). Since f (as) = hl and 2 i  k, by our deﬁnition of f -houses, hl must be the most
preferred house on as ’s preference list such that
∑i−1
p=1 f p,l < cl .
Now, by the inductive hypothesis, it must be the case that
⋃i−1
p=1 f p(hl) ⊆ M(hl). Since
∑i−1
p=1 f p,l < cl and hl is full, it
follows that
⋃i−1
p=1 f p(hl) ⊂ M(hl). Hence, it must be the case that M(hl)\
⋃i−1
p=1 f p(hl) 	= ∅. It follows that there exists some
agent at ∈ M(hl)\⋃i−1p=1 f p(hl) and, either (i) at ∈⋃kp=i f p(hl) or (ii) at /∈ f (hl). Clearly, in case (ii), at has priority  i by a
similar argument for as . For, if at has priority z < i, then by the inductive hypothesis, since hl′ = f (at) is an f z-house and
at ∈ f z(hl′ ), it follows that f z(hl′ ) ⊆ M(hl′ ). However, this gives a contradiction since M(at) 	= hl′ . Hence, at has priority  i
in both cases (i) and (ii). We can then promote ar to h j , promote as to hl and demote at to l(at) to obtain a matching whose
improvement in satisfaction is wi + wi − w(at) > 0, a contradiction. 
Lemma 4. Let M be a popular matching in any given WCHA instance I . Then, for each f-house h j ∈ H, if f j > c j , then
M(h j)\⋃d jp=1 f p(h j) ⊆ fd j+1(h j).
Proof. Clearly, fd j+1, j > c j −
∑d j
p=1 f p, j . It follows by Lemma 3 that
⋃d j
p=1 f p(h j) ⊆ M(h j) so that no matter whether h j is
full or undersubscribed, fd j+1(h j) M(h j). Hence, there exists some agent ar such that ar ∈ fd j+1(h j)\M(h j). Note that ar
has priority d j + 1. Clearly, since f (ar) = h j , ar must prefer to be assigned to h j rather than M(ar) by Lemma 2. Hence, if
h j is undersubscribed, we can promote ar to h j to obtain a more popular matching than M , a contradiction. It follows that
h j is full. We will show that M(h j)\⋃d jp=1 f p(h j) ⊆ fd j+1(h j).
If d j = 0, then it must be the case that f1, j > c j and ar ∈ f1(h j)\M(h j). If M(h j) ⊆ f1(h j), then the result is immediate.
Hence, suppose that M(h j) f1(h j). Choose any as ∈ M(h j)\ f1(h j). Clearly, either (i) as has priority 1 but f (as) = hl 	= h j
or (ii) as has priority > 1. In case (i), since f (as) = hl , as must prefer to be assigned to hl than h j by Lemma 2. Hence, if hl
is undersubscribed, we can promote ar to h j and as to hl to obtain a more popular matching, a contradiction. Thus, hl is full.
By Lemma 3,
⋃dl
p=1 f p(hl) ⊆ M(hl). Since as ∈ f1(hl)\M(hl), it follows that dl = 0, i.e., f1,l > cl . Now, if M(ar) = hl , then we
can promote ar to h j and promote as to hl to obtain a more popular matching. Hence, M(ar) 	= hl . Choose any at ∈ M(hl).
We then promote ar to h j , promote as to hl and demote at to l(at) to obtain a matching whose improvement in satisfaction
is w1 + w1 − w(at) > 0. In case (ii), we can promote ar to h j and demote as to l(as) to obtain a more popular matching.
Hence, d j  1. Suppose for a contradiction that M(h j)\⋃d jp=1 f p(h j) fd j+1(h j). It follows that there exists some agent
as ∈ M(h j)\⋃d j+1p=1 f p(h j). Recall that ar has priority d j + 1. Clearly, either (i) as has priority  d j + 1 but f (as) = hl 	= h j ,
or (ii) as has priority > d j + 1. It is immediate in case (ii) that we can promote ar to h j and demote as to l(as) to obtain a
more popular matching, a contradiction. Hence, case (i) applies. It follows by Lemma 2 that as prefers to be assigned to hl
than h j , and so, if hl is undersubscribed, we can then obtain a more popular matching by promoting ar to h j and promoting
as to hl . Hence hl is full. Now, if M(ar) = hl , we can then promote ar to h j and promote as to hl to obtain a more popular
matching. Hence, M(ar) 	= hl .
Let as have priority z1 so that z1  d j + 1. By our deﬁnition of f -houses, since hl = f (as), if z1 = 1, then hl is the
ﬁrst house on as ’s preference list. Since hl is full, then choose any at ∈ M(hl) and let at have priority z2. We obtain an
improvement in satisfaction of w(ar) + w(as) − w(at) = wd j+1 + w1 − wz2 > 0 by promoting ar to h j , promoting as to hl
and demoting at to l(at). Hence, it follows that z1 > 1. Then, hl must be the most preferred house on as ’s preference list
such that
∑z1−1
p=1 f p,l < cl . By deﬁnition of f (as) = hl , it follows that z1  dl + 1. Now, by Lemma 3,
⋃dl
p=1 f p(hl) ⊆ M(hl).
However, as /∈ M(hl). Hence, it follows that z1 > dl , i.e., it follows that z1 = dl + 1. Since ∑z1−1p=1 f p,l < cl and hl is full, it
follows that
⋃z1−1
p=1 f p(hl) ⊂ M(hl). Hence, we have that M(hl)\
⋃z1−1
p=1 f p(hl) 	= ∅. It follows that there exists some agent
at ∈ M(hl)\⋃z1−1 f p(hl). Clearly, either (i) at ∈⋃kp=z f p(hl) or (ii) at /∈ f (hl).p=1 1
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promote as to hl and demote at to l(at) to obtain a matching whose improvement in satisfaction is w(ar)+ w(as)− w(at) =
wd j+1 + wz1 − w(at) > 0, a contradiction. Hence z2 < z1, and so only case (ii) applies. Let hl′ = f (at). It is obvious, by
Lemma 2, that at prefers to be assigned to hl′ than hl . Furthermore, hl′ 	= h j , for suppose not. As z2 < z1  d j + 1 and f (at)
is deﬁned, it follows that z2  d j . By Lemma 3,
⋃z2
p=1 f p(h j) ⊆
⋃d j
p=1 f p(h j) ⊆ M(h j) so that at ∈ M(h j). However, this gives
a contradiction since at ∈ M(hl) and h j 	= hl . Clearly also, hl′ 	= M(ar) for otherwise, we can promote ar to h j , promote as
to hl and promote at to hl′ to obtain a more popular matching, a contradiction. Hence, the houses hl′ , hl , h j and M(ar) are
distinct. Clearly too, the agents ar , as and at are distinct for z2 < z1  d j + 1 and ar 	= as .
We assume that hl′ is full, for otherwise we can obtain a contradiction by promoting ar to h j , promoting as to hl
and promoting at to hl′ . Let au ∈ M(hl′ ). If z2 = 1, then we can promote ar to h j , promote as to hl , promote at to hl′
and demote au to l(au) to obtain a new matching with improvement in satisfaction w(ar) + w(as) + w(at) − w(au) =
wd j+1 + wz1 + w1 − w(au) > 0. Hence, z2 > 1. If we let at and au take the roles of as and at respectively, then it follows
by the argument that we use to deﬁne at that we are able to choose au such that au has priority < z2 and au /∈ f (hl′ ). It
follows that au is an agent distinct from ar , as and at since P (au) < z2.
By continuing this argument, it follows that we obtain a sequence of distinct agents a0,a1,a2,a3, . . . where a0 = ar ,
a1 = as , a2 = at , and a3 = au . For i  4, the above construction indicates that P (ai) < P (ai−1). If this sequence does not
terminate as a result of arriving at a contradiction due to any of the above cases, then we are bound to ultimately generate
an agent ax such that P (ax) < 1, which is impossible. 
Lemmas 3 and 4 give rise to the following corollary concerning the assignees of f -houses in popular matchings.
Corollary 5. Let M be a popular matching in any WCHA instance I . Then, for every f -house h j ,
1. if f j  c j , then f (h j) ⊆ M(h j);
2. if f j > c j , then |M(h j)| = c j and⋃d jp=1 f p(h j) ⊆ M(h j) ⊆⋃d j+1p=1 f p(h j).
Proof. In case 1, if f j  c j , it follows by deﬁnition of d j that
⋃k
p=d j+1 f p(h j) = ∅. Clearly then, f (h j) =
⋃d j
p=1 f p(h j) ⊆ M(h j)
by Lemma 3. In case 2, it follows by Lemmas 3 and 4 that
⋃d j
p=1 f p(h j) ⊆ M(h j), M(h j)\
⋃d j
p=1 f p(h j) ⊆ fd j+1(h j) and
|M(h j)| = c j . 
We now deﬁne the concept of an s-house for each agent. Given a popular matching M , if M(a) 	= f (a), then as we
shall show, M(a) = s(a). Given 1  z  k, for every agent a ∈ Pz , we deﬁne s(a) to be the most preferred house h j on a’s
preference list such that h j 	= f (a) and ∑zi=1 f i, j < c j . Note that s(a) may not exist if f (a) = l(a). However, all such agents
will be assigned to their f -houses in any matching since last resort houses are unique to individual agents.
A house h j ∈ H is an s-house if h j = s(a) for some a ∈ A. To illustrate the s-house deﬁnition, let us look at Instance I1 in
Fig. 1 again. We may verify from the deﬁnition of s-houses that s(a1) = h2, s(a2) = h4, s(a3) = h5, s(a4) = h5, s(a5) = h5 and
s(a6) = h2. Clearly, the set of f i-houses need not be disjoint from the set of s j-houses for i 	= j as seen from this example.
Now, since the process of deﬁning s-houses is analogous to the algorithm for deﬁning f -houses, the time complexity for
deﬁning s-houses is also O (m).
Now, it may be shown that a popular matching M will only assign an agent a to either f (a) or s(a) as indicated by the
next lemma.
Lemma 6. Let M be a popular matching in any WCHA instance I . Then, every agent a ∈ A is assigned in M to either f (a) or s(a).
Proof. Let a ∈ Pi and let M(a) = hx . Suppose that the statement of this lemma is false. By Lemma 2, a cannot be assigned
to a house better than f (a). Then, besides f (a) or s(a), hx can either be (i) a house between f (a) and s(a) or (ii) a house
worse than s(a).
In case (i), it follows that hx is an f -house such that
∑i
p=1 f p,x  cx , for otherwise s(a) = hx . Hence, fx  cx and
M(hx) ⊆ f (hx) by Corollary 5. However, a ∈ M(hx)\ f (hx), a contradiction.
In case (ii), let h j = s(a). It follows that a must prefer to be assigned to h j than M(a) = hx . Clearly, h j is full, for
otherwise we can promote a to h j , a contradiction. It follows by our deﬁnition of s-houses that
∑i
p=1 f p, j < c j . Hence,
by our deﬁnition of d j , i  d j . Since
⋃d j
p=1 f p(h j) ⊆ M(h j) (by Lemma 3) and h j is full, it follows that
⋃i
p=1 f p(h j) ⊂
M(h j) so that M(h j)\⋃ip=1 f p(h j) 	= ∅. Hence, there exists some as ∈ M(h j)\⋃ip=1 f p(h j). It is obvious that either (i) as ∈⋃k
p=i+1 f p(h j), or (ii) as /∈ f (h j).
Clearly in case (i), as has priority > i, so we can promote a to h j and demote as to l(as) to obtain a matching whose
improvement in satisfaction is wi −w(as) > 0. In case (ii), let as have priority z1. It follows that z1  i, for otherwise, we can
promote a to h j and demote as to l(as) to obtain a new matching whose improvement in satisfaction is wi − wz1 > 0. Let
108 C.T.S. Sng, D.F. Manlove / Journal of Discrete Algorithms 8 (2010) 102–116f (as) = hl . Clearly, as must prefer to be assigned to hl than h j by Lemma 2. If hl is undersubscribed, we can then promote a
to h j and promote as to hl to obtain a more popular matching, a contradiction. Hence, suppose that hl is full. Let at ∈ M(hl).
If z1 = 1, then we can promote a to h j , promote as to hl and demote at to l(at) to obtain a matching with improvement in
satisfaction w(a)+ w(as)− w(at) = wi + w1 − w(at) > 0. Hence, suppose that z1 > 1. Clearly, hx 	= hl for suppose otherwise.
By Corollary 5, hl must be an f -house such that fl > cl by existence of as , for otherwise as ∈ M(hl). It follows that M(hl) ⊆
f (hl). Now, if hl = hx , then this gives us a contradiction since a ∈ M(hl) but hx 	= f (a) for a prefers s(a) to hx .
Hence, hl 	= hx . Then, at 	= a. It follows that we can reuse arguments from the proof of Lemma 4 to obtain a sequence
of distinct agents a0,a1,a2, . . . where a0 = a, a1 = as , and a2 = at . For j  3, the construction of the sequence indicates
that P (ai) < P (ai−1). If this sequence does not terminate as a result of arriving at a contradiction due to any of the cases
outlined in Lemma 4, then we are bound to ultimately generate an agent ax such that P (ax) < 1, which is impossible. 
Corollary 5 and Lemma 6 give rise to the following result.
Theorem 7. Let M be a popular matching in any given WCHA instance I .
1. For every f -house h j ,
(a) if f j  c j , then f (h j) ⊆ M(h j);
(b) if f j > c j , then |M(h j)| = c j and⋃d jp=1 f p(h j) ⊆ M(h j) ⊆⋃d j+1p=1 f p(h j).
2. Every agent a is assigned to either f (a) or s(a).
3. Algorithm for ﬁnding a popular matching
Let us form a subgraph G ′ of G by letting G ′ contain only two edges for each agent a ∈ A, that is, one to f (a) and
the other to s(a). It follows that all popular matchings must be contained in G ′ by Theorem 7. However, Theorem 7 only
gives us necessary conditions for a matching to be popular in an instance of WCHA, since not all matchings in G ′ sat-
isfying these conditions are popular. For, let us consider the example WCHA instance in Fig. 1. We have at least two
matchings which satisfy conditions 1 and 2 of Theorem 7: M1 = {(a1,h1), (a2,h3), (a3,h3), (a4,h5), (a5,h4), (a6,h4)} and
M2 = {(a1,h1), (a2,h3), (a3,h3), (a4,h4), (a5,h5), (a6,h4)}. However, while M1 may be veriﬁed to be a popular matching,
M2 is not popular because there exists another matching M3 = {(a2,h1), (a3,h3), (a4,h3), (a5,h4), (a6,h4)} which gives an
improvement in satisfaction of w(a2) + w(a4) + w(a5) − w(a1) = 4 + 2 + 2 − 7 > 0 over M2. Hence, we will “enforce” the
suﬃciency of the conditions by removing certain edges in G ′ that cannot form part of any popular matching in I . We show
how to do this by ﬁrst introducing the notion of a potential improvement path or PIP in short, which generalises the concept
of a promotion path from [17] to WCHA.
3.1. Potential improvement paths
Let us now deﬁne a matching M that satisﬁes conditions 1 and 2 of Theorem 7 to be well-formed. Then, a PIP leading
out of some f -house h0 with respect to a well-formed matching M is an alternating path Π = 〈h0,a0,h1,a1, . . . ,hx,ax〉
such that hi = f (ai) and (ai,hi) ∈ M for 0 i  x, and ai prefers hi+1 to hi for i < x. A PIP leading out of h0 always exists,
which can be seen as follows. Since h0 is an f -house and c0  1, there exists some agent a′0 ∈ f (h0)∩ M(h0) by Theorem 7.
Then, by deﬁnition, 〈h0,a′0〉 is a PIP leading out of h0. The next lemma shows that any PIP leading out of h0 must contain a
sequence of agents with strictly decreasing priorities. It follows that the sequence of agents in Π must be distinct.
Lemma 8. Let M be a well-formedmatching. LetΠ = 〈h0,a0, . . . ,hx,ax〉 be a PIP with respect to M leading out of h0 as deﬁned above.
Then, P (ai+1) < P (ai) for 0 i < x.
Proof. Let a0 have priority z1. If x = 0, then a0 is the last (only) agent in the path. Otherwise, x > 0 and it follows by
deﬁnition of Π that h0 is not the ﬁrst house on a0’s preference list as h1 is a house that a0 prefers to h0. Hence, it must be
that h1 is an f -house such that
∑z1−1
p=1 f p,1  c1 by deﬁnition of f (a0) = h0.
Since M is well-formed and f1  c1, it follows by Theorem 7 that |M(h1)| = c1 and M(h1) ⊆ f (h1). Now, if ∑z1−1p=1 f p,1 =
c1, then by deﬁnition of an f -house, f p,1 = 0 for z1  p  k. Hence, d1  z1 − 1. Since f1 = c1, it follows that M(h1) ⊆⋃z1−1
p=1 f p(h1) by Theorem 7. On the other hand, if
∑z1−1
p=1 f p,1 > c1, then f1 > c1 and d1+1 z1−1. It follows by Theorem 7
again that M(h1) ⊆⋃z1−1p=1 f p(h1). Clearly as a result, M(h1) ⊆⋃z1−1p=1 f p(h1) in all cases.
Since a1 ∈ M(h1), it follows that f (a1) = h1 and a1 has priority strictly less than z1. Moreover, we can repeat the
argument to deduce the priority of each agent ai in Π . It is then straightforward to see that the priority of any agent in Π
must be strictly less than its predecessor so that P (ai+1) < P (ai) for each i  0. 
Let us deﬁne the cost of Π to be cost(Π) = w(ax) − w(ax−1) − · · · − w(a0) if x > 0. Note that cost(Π) = w(a0) if x = 0.
We now motivate the notion of a PIP as follows. Let us suppose that there exists some agent ar who prefers h0 to M(ar). The
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small
1: for all f -house h do
2: λ(h) := w1; {a suitable upper bound}
3: end for
4: for z in 1..k do
5: for all a ∈ Pz do
6: let S contain the set of houses that a prefers to f (a);
7: if S 	= ∅ then
8: λmin(a, f (a)) := min{λ(h): h ∈ S};
9: else
10: λmin(a, f (a)) := ∞; // a suitable default value
11: end if
12: if λmin(a, f (a)) < wz then
13: return “No popular matching exists”;
14: end if
15: end for
16: for all f z-house h j do
17: f ′z(h j) := f z(h j);
18: if z d j then
19: for all a ∈ f ′z(h j) do
20: remove (a, s(a)) from G ′;
21: end for
22: else {z = d j + 1}
23: for all a ∈ f ′z(h j) such that λmin(a,h j) < 2wz do
24: remove (a,h j) from G ′;
25: remove a from f ′z(h j);
26: end for
27: if f ′z(h j) = ∅ then {| f ′z(h j)| < c j −
∑d j
p=1 f p, j}
28: return “No popular matching exists”;
29: end if
30: end if
31: λz(h j) := min(wz,min{λmin(a,h j) − wz: a ∈ f ′z(h j)}); // λmin(a,h j) wz
32: λ(h j) := min(λ(h j), λz(h j));
33: if z > d j and λ(h j) < wz then
34: return “No popular matching exists”;
35: end if
36: end for
37: end for
next lemma shows that any such agent cannot belong to Π . Now, if cost(Π) < w(ar), we can conclude that the well-formed
matching M is not popular because we can promote ar to h j , and use the PIP to promote each ai to hi+1 for all i < x and
demote ax to l(ax) to obtain a new matching that is more popular than M .
Lemma 9. Let M be a well-formedmatching. LetΠ = 〈h0,a0, . . . ,hx,ax〉 be a PIP with respect to M leading out of h0 as deﬁned above.
Then, any agent a who prefers h0 to M(a) does not belong to Π .
Proof. Let a have priority z. Since M is well-formed, either (i) M(a) = f (a) or (ii) M(a) = s(a). It follows in case (i)
that
∑z−1
p=1 f p,0  c0 by deﬁnition of f (a). In case (ii), either (a) h0 = f (a) or (b) h0 is an f -house such that h0 	= f (a)
and
∑z
p=1 f p,0  c0 by deﬁnition of s(a). Now, in subcase (a), if
∑z
p=1 f p,0 < c0, then z  d0 so that
⋃z
p=1 f p(h0) ⊆⋃d0
p=1 f p(h0) ⊆ M(h0) since M is a well-formed matching. However, this implies that a ∈ M(h0), a contradiction. It fol-
lows in all cases that
∑z
p=1 f p,0  c0. Using a similar argument as in Lemma 8, we can establish that |M(h0)| = c0 and
M(h0) ⊆⋃zp=1 f p(h0). It follows that P (a)  P (a0) and hence, the priority of a must be greater than the priority of any
other agent in Π by Lemma 8. Since a 	= a0, a cannot be an agent in Π . 
3.2. Pruning the graph
Let us now introduce Algorithm Prune-WCHA which will enable us to remove certain edges in G ′ that cannot be part of
any popular matching. The algorithm is divided into two stages, with the ﬁrst stage shown in Algorithm 2 and the second
stage shown in Algorithm 3. The ﬁrst stage is carried out in phases, with each phase corresponding to a priority level Pz .
Intuitively, in each phase in the ﬁrst stage, we compute the costs of PIPs and determine the minimum of these leading
out of each f -house h j , and then use these values to identify and remove certain edges incident to f -houses in G ′ that
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1: for all a ∈ A do
2: let hl := s(a);
3: let R contain the set of houses that a prefers to hl;
4: let S contain the set of houses that a prefers to f (a);
5: R := R − (S ∪ { f (a)});
6: if R 	= ∅ then
7: λmin(a,hl) := min{λ(h): h ∈ R};
8: else
9: λmin(a,hl) := ∞; // a suitable default value
10: end if
11: if λmin(a,hl) < w(a) or fl  cl then
12: remove (a,hl) from G ′;
13: end if
14: end for
cannot belong to any popular matching. Based on the minimum values of PIPs calculated for f -houses in the ﬁrst stage, we
then identify and remove in the second stage edges incident to s-houses in G ′ that cannot belong to any popular matching.
Let G ′′ denote the graph obtained from G ′ once the algorithm terminates (following these edge removals) – we refer to G ′′
as the pruned graph. The removal of these edges will ensure that any well-formed matching in G ′′ is popular. Over the
phases of execution, certain conditions may arise which signal to the algorithm that no popular matching exists.
Recall that h j may be an f -house for more than one priority level, and h j may be an f -house for more than one agent
for each priority level. In the algorithm, we will use λz(h j) as a variable and its value at the end of the algorithm equals
the minimum cost of a PIP leading out of h j taken over all well-formed matchings in G ′′ such that (ar,h j) is the ﬁrst edge
for some ar ∈ Pz . We will also use λ(h j) to compute the minimum cost taken over all λz(h j). Note that we initialise λ(h)
to w1 for every f -house h at the outset of the ﬁrst stage of Algorithm Prune-WCHA, for if Π is any PIP leading out of h,
then cost(Π) w(ax), where ax is the ﬁnal agent on the path. However, w(ax) w1. Hence, w1 is an upper bound for the
ﬁnal computed value of λ(h). Let Πmin(h j) denote a PIP with minimum cost leading out of h j taken over all well-formed
matchings in G ′′ . Let cost(Πmin(h j)) denote the cost of this path. Then, as we shall show, the ﬁnal value of λ(h j) in the
execution of the algorithm gives us the value of cost(Πmin(h j)).
For any agent as ∈ A, let S contain the set of houses on as ’s preference list that as prefers to f (as). Note that S will be
empty if f (as) is the ﬁrst house on as ’s preference list. If S 	= ∅, we will use λmin(as, f (as)) within the algorithm to compute
the minimum cost of a PIP out of hq , taken over all hq ∈ S , and over all well-formed matchings in G ′′; otherwise, the
algorithm sets λmin(as, f (as)) to ∞ as a suitable default value. Similarly, let R contain the set of houses on as ’s preference
list after f (as) that as prefers to s(as). If R 	= ∅, we will use λmin(as, s(as)) within the algorithm to compute the minimum
cost of a PIP out of hq , taken over all hq ∈ R , and over all well-formed matchings in G ′′; otherwise, the algorithm sets
λmin(as, s(as)) to ∞ as a suitable default value.
3.3. Proof of correctness
The following lemma gives an important technical result regarding the correctness of the algorithm.
Lemma 10. Let z be an iteration of the for loop on line 4 of the ﬁrst stage of Algorithm Prune-WCHA. Suppose that, by the end of this
iteration, the algorithm has not terminated with a report that no popular matching exists. Let h j ∈ H be any fz-house. Then, at the end
of this loop iteration:
1. for each a ∈ Pz, if f (a) is not the ﬁrst ranked house in a’s preference list, then λmin(a, f (a)) equals the minimum cost of all PIPs
among all houses that a prefers to f (a) taken over all well-formed matchings in G ′′; else, λmin(a, f (a)) = ∞.
2. λz(h j) stores the minimum cost among all PIPs taken over all well-formed matchings in G ′′ such that (a,h j) is the ﬁrst edge for
some a ∈ Pz.
3. λ(h j) stores the minimum cost among all PIPs taken over all well-formed matchings in G ′′ such that (a,h j) is the ﬁrst edge for
some a ∈ Pq where 1 q z.
4. if any edge has been removed from G ′ , then it cannot be part of any popular matching.
Proof. Given 1 z k, we will proceed by induction on z.
For the base case, let z = 1. If a ∈ P1, then clearly S = ∅ for a so that ∞ is assigned to λmin(a, f (a)) as required in
line 10. Now, any PIP leading out of h j and containing the edge (a,h j) ends at a and has cost w1. Clearly, w1 is assigned to
λz(h j) as required at line 31 since λmin(a′,h j) = ∞ for each a′ ∈ f ′1(h j). Also, w1 is assigned to λ(h j) at line 32 as required,
since this is the minimum of λz(h j) and the initialised value of λ(h j) which is also w1. Finally, the only edges removed
during this iteration are dealt with at lines 19–21 (as the condition in line 23 is not satisﬁed). For, clearly if a ∈ P1 and
d j  1, a must be assigned to f (a) = h j and not s(a) in any well-formed matching M by condition 1 of Theorem 7. Hence,
the edge (a, s(a)) cannot belong to any popular matching.
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that S 	= ∅. Choose any hl ∈ S . It follows that ∑z−1p=1 f p,l  cl by deﬁnition of h j = f (a). Hence, it is impossible that hl can
be an f p-house for any p  z. By the inductive hypothesis, λ(hl) stores the minimum cost among all PIPs leading out of
hl where (a′,hl) is the ﬁrst edge for some a′ ∈ Pq where 1  q  z − 1. Hence, λ(hl) stores the minimum cost among all
PIPs leading out of hl at the end of the iteration z − 1. Thus, if S 	= ∅, then when λmin(a, f (a)) is deﬁned during iteration z
in line 8, it contains the minimum cost of a PIP leading out of any house that a prefers to f (a); otherwise, S = ∅ and
λmin(a, f (a)) is assigned to be ∞ in line 10 as required.
Now, it follows that the minimum cost of a PIP out of h j for which the ﬁrst edge is (a,h j) such that a ∈ f z(h j) either
stops at a and has cost wz , or it continues. If it continues, it must do so with some edge (a,hl) such that a prefers hl to h j .
Hence, the minimum cost of a PIP out of h j for which the ﬁrst edge is (a,h j) is the minimum of wz and λmin(a,h j) − wz .
Clearly then, this is exactly the value assigned to λz(h j) on line 31 as required. Also, it follows by the inductive hypothesis
that λ(h j) should be set at iteration z to be the minimum of λz(h j) and the value of λ(h j) at the end of iteration z − 1.
This is precisely the value assigned to λ(h j) at line 32.
Finally, it remains to show that any edge removed during iteration z cannot belong to part of any popular matching.
Now, if z  d j , then it follows by Theorem 7 that a must be assigned to h j and not s(a) for any well-formed matching
M . Hence, the edge (a, s(a)) cannot belong to any well-formed matching and is deleted in line 20 as required. Clearly, if
f j  c j , then it is bound to be the case that z d j .
On the other hand, if z > d j , then it follows that in any well-formed matching M ,
⋃d j
p=1 f p(h j) ⊆ M(h j) but only a
proper subset of fd j+1(h j) will be assigned to h j in M . Now, suppose that a ∈ M(h j) ∩ fd j+1(h j). It follows that z = d j + 1.
Let hl be any house that a prefers to h j , supposing that such a house exists. Clearly, if there exists a minimum cost PIP Π
out of hl such that cost(Πmin(hl))− wz < wz , then Π can be used to promote a to hl , and in the process, free up a space in
h j which can thus be assigned to any agent a′ in fd j+1(h j)\M(h j). Clearly, M(a′) = s(a′) since M is well-formed so that a′
improves as result. It follows that M cannot be popular since we can promote a′ to h j , promote a to hl and promote along
Π to obtain a more popular matching than M . Hence, if λmin(a,h j) < 2wz , then M is not popular. Since M is arbitrary, the
edge (a,h j) cannot belong to any popular matching so that we delete it in line 24.
Note that Πmin(hl) must be a minimum cost PIP with respect to M . For, let us consider the ﬁrst edge (b,hl) in Πmin(hl).
Note that fl  cl and dl + 1< z since hl is a house that a prefers to f (a) = h j .
Suppose ﬁrstly that b ∈ fdl+1(hl). Let λdl be the value of λ(hl) at the end of phase dl . Now, we have that the value of
λ(hl) as computed in phase dl + 1 by lines 31–32 of the algorithm is equal to min(wdl+1, λdl ,min{λmin(b′,hl) − wdl+1: b′ ∈
f ′dl+1(hl)}). Let us suppose that min{λmin(b′,hl)−wdl+1: b′ ∈ f ′dl+1(hl)} < wdl+1. Then, there exists some agent b′ ∈ f ′dl+1(hl)
such that λmin(b′,hl)−wdl+1 < wdl+1, i.e., λmin(b′,hl) < 2wdl+1. However, such a b′ would have been removed from f ′dl+1(hl)
at line 25, a contradiction. Hence, λmin(b′,hl)− wdl+1  wdl+1 for all b′ ∈ f ′dl+1(hl). It follows that any minimum cost PIP in
G ′′ (with respect to any well-formed matching) with (b′,hl) as its ﬁrst edge must have cost greater than or equal to wdl+1,
i.e., cost(Πmin(hl))  wdl+1. Now, suppose that λdl < wdl+1. Then, there exists a PIP leading out of hl whose ﬁrst edge is
(c,hl) where P (c) dl , with cost less than wdl+1. However, this then contradicts the fact that the PIP with (b,hl) as its ﬁrst
edge has minimum cost for hl as we supposed. Hence, wdl+1 is a lower bound for the ﬁnal computed value of λ(hl). Clearly
then, λ(hl) = wdl+1. Since (b,hl) is the ﬁrst edge of Πmin(hl) where b ∈ fdl+1(hl), then as this path is deﬁned with respect
to some well-formed matching, it follows that (b′,hl) ∈ M for some b′ ∈ fdl+1(hl) (possibly b = b′), since M is well-formed.
Then, 〈hl,b′〉 is a PIP of cost wdl+1 with respect to M . Moreover, since wdl+1 = cost(Πmin(hl)) < 2wz as established in the
previous paragraph, it follows that we can promote a to hl , promote a′ to h j and demote b′ from hl so that M is not popular
as shown above.
Hence, b ∈⋃dlp=1 f p(hl). Clearly then, (b,hl) must belong to every well-formed matching by condition 1(a) of Theorem 7
so that (b,hl) must belong to M . It follows that we can repeat the above argument to show that Πmin(hl) is a minimum
cost PIP with respect to M by considering the remaining alternate edges in Πmin(hl). If each alternate edge (c,hx) satisﬁes
the condition c ∈⋃dxp=1 f p(hx), then the result is immediate. Otherwise, it must be the case that we encounter some edge
(c′,hx′ ) in Πmin(hl) such that c′ ∈ fdx′+1(hx′ ). Clearly then, (c′,hx′ ) is the ﬁnal edge in Πmin(hl) so that we must be able
to promote a to hl , promote a′ to h j and promote along Πmin(hl) to obtain a more popular matching than M by a similar
argument to that in the previous paragraph. 
The next three lemmas establish the correctness of the algorithm.
Lemma 11. Suppose that Algorithm Prune-WCHA does not terminate during the execution of its ﬁrst stage by reporting that no popular
matching exists. Then, any edge removed by Algorithm Prune-WCHA over both stages cannot belong to a popular matching.
Proof. By Lemma 10, any edges removed by Algorithm Prune-WCHA in the ﬁrst stage cannot belong to any popular match-
ing. We now show that any edges removed by the algorithm in the second stage also cannot belong to any popular matching.
Let M be any well-formed matching. Let a be any agent and let P (a) = z. Also, let R contain the set of houses between
f (a) and s(a) on a’s preference list that a prefers to s(a) (not including f (a) and s(a)). Let s(a) = hl . Suppose that M(a) = hl .
Let h j ∈ R and suppose that cost(Πmin(h j)) < wz . Clearly, Πmin(h j) must be a minimum cost PIP with respect to M by a
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to obtain a more popular matching than M . Hence, M cannot be popular. It follows that an edge pruned due to the ﬁrst
condition in line 11 of the second stage of the algorithm cannot belong to any popular matching.
Now, if fl  cl and M(a) = hl , then M cannot be popular by condition 1 of Theorem 7, since M(hl)⋃dl+1p=1 f p(hl). This
shows that the edge (a,hl) pruned due to the second condition in line 11 of the second stage of the algorithm also cannot
belong to any popular matching.
It thus follows that any edges removed by the algorithm cannot belong to a popular matching. 
Lemma 12. If Algorithm Prune-WCHA reports that no popular matching exists, then I does not admit a popular matching.
Proof. Let us consider the cases where Algorithm Prune-WCHA reports that no popular matchings exist as a result of some
condition being satisﬁed: (i) lines 12–13, (ii) lines 27–28 and (iii) lines 33–34 during some iteration z of the for loop on
line 4 of the ﬁrst stage. Suppose for a contradiction that M is a popular matching in I . Then M is a well-formed matching
in G ′ by Theorem 7. Also M is a well-formed matching in G ′′ , since no edge of M is deleted by the algorithm up to this
point by Lemma 10.
In case (i), let a be the agent considered during the relevant iteration of the for loop on line 5 when the algorithm
terminates. Then P (a) = z. Let h j = f (a) and let hl be a house that a prefers to h j such that λmin(a,h j) = cost(Πmin(hl)).
It follows by a similar argument to that used in the proof of Lemma 10 that Πmin(hl) must be a minimum cost PIP with
respect to M . Now, if λ(hl) < wz , then we can use Πmin(hl) to free hl and then promote a to hl to obtain a more popular
matching than M . Hence, M cannot be popular, a contradiction.
In case (ii), clearly f j > c j . Now, if f ′d j+1(h j) = ∅ after the removal of edges in lines 23–26, then it follows that no well-
formed matching can exist in G ′′ since no matching can satisfy condition 1(b) of Theorem 7, a contradiction to the earlier
observation that M is a well-formed matching in G ′′ .
In case (iii), z = d j + 1. Clearly, only a proper subset of agents in fd j+1(h j) can be assigned to h j in M since f j > c j . Let
a ∈ fd j+1(h j)\M(h j). Note that Πmin(h j) must be a minimum cost PIP with respect to M using a similar argument in the
proof of Lemma 10. Now, if λ(h j) < wd j+1, then Πmin(h j) can be used to free up a place in h j and then promote a (who
must be assigned to s(a) in M) to h j to obtain a matching that is more popular than M , a contradiction. 
Lemma 13. Suppose that Algorithm Prune-WCHA does not state that no popular matching exists. Let M be a well-formed matching in
the pruned graph G ′′ . Then, M is popular.
Proof. Now, if M is not popular, it follows that there exists another matching M ′ which is more popular than M . Let us
clone G ′′ to obtain a cloned graph C(G ′′) as follows. We replace every house h j ∈ H with the clones h1j ,h2j , . . . ,h
c j
j . We then
divide the capacity of each house among its clones by allowing each clone to have capacity 1. In addition, if (a,h j) is an
edge in G ′′ , then we add (a,hpj ) to the edge set of C(G
′′) for all p (1 p  c j). Let us then adapt the well-formed matching
M in G ′′ to obtain its clone C(M) in C(G ′′) as follows. If a house h j in G ′′ is assigned to x j agents a1, . . . ,ax j in M , then we
add (ap,h
p
j ) to C(M) for 1 p  x j , so that |C(M)| = |M|. We repeat a similar process for M ′ to obtain its clone C(M ′) in
C(G ′′).
Let us consider X = C(M) ⊕ C(M ′). Since sat(M ′,M) > 0, let a ∈ A be an agent who prefers M ′ to M . Let P (a) = z and
let M ′(a) = h j . We will show that there exists a PIP Π leading out of h j with respect to M . Since M is well-formed, we can
reuse a similar argument to the proof of Lemma 9 to establish that h j is an f -house such that
∑z
p=1 f p, j  c j . It follows
that h j is full in M and M(h j) ⊆ f (h j) by Theorem 7. Let ar ∈ M(h j)\M ′(h j) (ar must exist since h j is full in M) and let
P (ar) = z1. Then, a 	= ar . Also, it follows that f (ar) = h j and z1  z. If ar does not prefer M ′ to M , then we ﬁnish tracing Π .
Otherwise, we will extend Π to make sure that it ends with some agent b who prefers M to M ′ . It follows by deﬁnition of
f (ar) that M ′(ar) = hl is an f -house that ar prefers to h j such that ∑z1−1p=1 f p,l  cl and hence by Theorem 7, M(hl) ⊆ f (hl).
Let as ∈ M(hl)\M ′(hl) and let P (as) = z2. Clearly then, z2 < z1. It follows by the same argument as for ar that if as does not
prefer M ′ to M , then we ﬁnish tracing Π , i.e., Π = 〈h j,ar,hl,as〉. Otherwise, we repeat the argument until we encounter an
agent at who does not prefer M ′ to M so that Π terminates. Clearly, this will eventually happen since all agents in Π are
assigned in M to their f -house and the priority levels of agents are strictly decreasing so that we must eventually reach
some agent at ∈ P1 such that M(at) = f (at). However, it is then impossible that at prefers M ′ to M . Finally, by construction
of Π , it follows that Π belongs to X since Π (with appropriate superscripts for house clones) consists of alternate edges in
C(M)\C(M ′) and C(M ′)\C(M).
We have established that for every a ∈ P (M ′,M), there exists a PIP Π(a) leading out of h j , where h j = M ′(a). Let
Γ = {Π(a): a ∈ P (M ′,M)} and let Γ ′ ⊆ Γ contain only those maximal PIPs in Γ . We will show that there exists an agent
d ∈ A such that Π(d) ∈ Γ ′ and cost(Π(d)) < w(d). For, suppose that cost(Π(a)) w(a) for every Π(a) ∈ Γ ′ . Let Π(a) ∈ Γ ′
and let Π(a) = 〈h0,a0,h1,a1, . . . ,hx,ax〉. We deﬁne l(Π(a)) = ax . Also, cost(Π(a)) = w(ax) − w(ax−1) − · · · − w(a0) w(a),
i.e., w(a) + w(a0) + · · · + w(ax−1) w(ax). Now, {a,a0, . . . ,ax−1} ⊆ P (M ′,M) whilst ax ∈ P (M,M ′). Let D be the connected
component of X containing Π(a) (with appropriate superscripts for house clones). It follows that D must be a path or cycle
whose edges alternate between C(M) and C(M ′). Clearly, D cannot be an even-length alternating path with more agents
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unassigned in C(M) and hence in M , a contradiction to the deﬁnition of a well-formed matching. Hence, D is either an
(i) even-length alternating path with more houses than agents, or (ii) an odd-length alternating path whose end edges be-
long to C(M), or (iii) a cycle. It is obvious that D contains distinct agents and so we cannot have overlapping maximal PIPs.
Hence, by construction of Γ ′ , the agents in Π(a), together with a, but not including l(Π(a)), taken over all Π(a) ∈ Γ ′ , form
a partition of P (M ′,M). Moreover, for every such a, we have established the existence of some l(Π(a)) ∈ P (M,M ′). Hence,∑
a∈P (M ′,M)
w(a) =
∑
Π(a)∈Γ ′
w(a) +
∑
Π(a)∈Γ ′
∑{
w(a′): a′ ∈ Π(a) ∧ a′ 	= l(Π(a))}

∑
Π(a)∈Γ ′
{
w(a′): a′ = l(Π(a))}

∑
a∈P (M,M ′)
w(a).
It follows that sat(M ′,M)  0, a contradiction. As a result, cost(Π(d)) < w(d) for some Π(d) ∈ Γ ′ . Let h j = M ′(d).
Now, if M(d) = f (d), then lines 12–13 of the ﬁrst stage of the algorithm would report that no popular matching exists
since λmin(d, f (d)) < w(d), a contradiction. Hence, M(d) = s(d) and h j is (i) better than f (d), or (ii) equal to f (d), or (iii)
between f (d) and s(d) on a’s preference list. In case (i), we obtain the same contradiction as when M(d) = f (d) since
λmin(d, f (d)) < w(d). In case (ii), f (d) = h j . Since M(d) = s(d), it must be the case that d ∈ fd j+1(h j) for otherwise (d, s(d))
would have been deleted by line 20 of the ﬁrst stage of the algorithm. Clearly though, lines 33–34 of the ﬁrst stage of the
algorithm would report that no popular matching exists, a contradiction. In case (iii), (d, s(d)) would have been deleted
by lines 11–12 of the second stage of the algorithm since λmin(d, s(d)) < w(d), a contradiction. It follows that we obtain a
contradiction in all cases so that M ′ is not more popular than M . 
Finally, the next lemma shows that if there is no well-formed matching in the pruned graph G ′′ , then no popular
matching exists.
Lemma 14. Let G ′′ be the pruned graph for a given WCHA instance I . If there is no well-formed matching in G ′′ , then no popular
matching exists in I .
Proof. Suppose that there exists a popular matching M in I . Now, by Theorem 7, M is a well-formed matching in G ′ .
Moreover, all edges of M must belong to G ′′ by Lemma 11. However, this implies that M is a well-formed matching in G ′′ ,
a contradiction. 
We now use the example in Fig. 1 to illustrate our algorithm. After the ﬁrst stage, we have λ(h1) = 7, λ(h3) = 3 and
λ(h4) = 2. We remove the edges (a1,h2) in phase 1 of the ﬁrst stage, and (a2,h4) and (a3,h5) in phase 2 of the ﬁrst stage
(all in line 20 of the ﬁrst stage) since a1 belongs to fd1 (h1), and a2 and a3 belong to fd3 (h3) respectively. We also remove
the edge (a4,h4) in phase 3 of the ﬁrst stage (in lines 24–25 of the ﬁrst stage) since λmin(a4,h4) = 3 < 2w(a4). No further
edges are removed in the second stage.
3.4. Finding a popular matching
We are now left with the task of ﬁnding a well-formed matching M in G ′′ in order to ﬁnd a popular matching if one
exists. Note that the removal of edges from G ′ by Algorithm Prune-WCHA effectively reduces the problem to that of ﬁnding
a popular matching in an instance of CHA.
Algorithm Popular-CHA
We give a brief recap of Algorithm Popular-CHA, shown in Algorithm 4, for ﬁnding a popular matching or reporting that
none exists, given an instance I of CHA [14]. For consistency with [14], the algorithm pseudocode and the accompanying
description in this subsection assumes that Algorithm Popular-CHA will be applied to G ′ , however when we return to the
WCHA context in the next subsection, this algorithm will in fact be applied to G ′′ . The algorithm begins by using a pre-
processing step (lines 2–12) on G ′ that matches each agent to their ﬁrst-choice house h j whenever f j  c j , so as to satisfy
condition 1(a) of the following theorem, which is a counterpart of Theorem 7 for CHA:
Theorem 15. (See [14].) A matching M is popular in a CHA instance I if and only if
1. for every f -house h j ,
(a) if f j  c j , then f (h j) ⊆ M(h j);
(b) if f j > c j , then |M(h j)| = c j and M(h j) ⊆ f (h j).
2. M is an agent-completematching (i.e., a matching in which all agents are assigned) in G ′ .
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1: M := ∅;
2: for all f -house h j do
3: c′j := c j ;
4: if f j  c j then
5: for all ai ∈ f (h j) do
6: M := M ∪ {(ai,h j)};
7: delete ai and its incident edges from G ′;
8: end for
9: c′j := c j − f j ;
10: end if
11: end for
12: remove all isolated and full houses, and their incident edges, from G ′;
13: compute a maximum matching M ′ in G ′ using capacities c′j ;
14: if M ′ is not agent-complete in G ′ then
15: output “no popular matching exists”;
16: else
17: M := M ∪ M ′;
18: for all ai ∈ A do
19: h j := f (ai);
20: if f j > c j and |M(h j)| < c j and h j 	= M(ai) then
21: promote ai from M(ai) to h j in M;
22: end if
23: end for
24: end if
The next step of Algorithm 4 computes a maximum matching M ′ in G ′ , according to the adjusted house capacities c′j
that are deﬁned following pre-processing. The subgraph G ′ can be viewed as an instance of the Upper Degree-Constrained
Subgraph problem (UDCS) [7]. (An instance of UDCS is essentially the same as an instance of CHA, except that agents have
no explicit preferences in the UDCS case; the deﬁnition of a matching is unchanged.) We use Gabow’s algorithm [7] to
compute M ′ in G ′ and then test whether M ′ is agent-complete. The pre-allocations are then added to M ′ to give M . As
a last step, we ensure that M also meets condition 1(b) of Theorem 15. For, suppose that h j ∈ H is an f -house such that
f j > c j . Then by deﬁnition, h j cannot be an s-house. Thus if ak ∈ M(h j) prior to the third for loop, it follows that ak ∈ f (h j).
At this stage, if h j is undersubscribed in M , we repeatedly promote any agent ai ∈ f (h j)\M(h j) from M(ai) (note that M(ai)
must be s(ai) and hence cannot be an f -house hl such that fl > cl) to h j until h j is full, ensuring that M(h j) ⊆ f (h j).
Using Algorithm Popular-CHA for WCHA
We now show how to use Algorithm Popular-CHA in order to ﬁnd a popular matching or report that none exists, given
an instance of WCHA. Firstly we consider the problem of trying to assign agents to each f -house h j so that h j satisﬁes
condition 1 of a well-formed matching.
Now, if f j  c j , then ensuring that
⋃d j
p=1 f p(h j) ⊆ M(h j) is equivalent to ensuring condition 1(a) of Theorem 15. This
work is done by lines 2–11 of Algorithm Popular-CHA. On the other hand, if f j > c j , we need to ensure that those agents
with priority at most d j are assigned to h j in M , i.e., there does not exist any agent a ∈⋃d jp=1 f p(h j)\M(h j). Now, since line
20 in the ﬁrst stage of Algorithm Prune-WCHA ensures the removal of the edge (a, s(a)) for every a ∈⋃d jp=1 f p(h j), it follows
that a must be assigned to f (a) if an agent-complete matching is to exist. This is equivalent to the work done by lines
13–15 of Algorithm Popular-CHA, which tries to ﬁnd an agent-complete matching and reports that no popular matching
exists if unsuccessful. Furthermore, lines 18–23 of Algorithm Popular-CHA also ensure that if f j > c j , then |M(h j)| = c j and
M(h j)\⋃d jp=1 f p(h j) ⊆ fd j+1(h j). Lastly, we need to ensure that each agent is assigned to either f (a) or s(a) and it is evident
that running Algorithm Popular-CHA on the pruned graph G ′′ does this. Hence, we can ﬁnd a popular matching in WCHA,
if one exists, by running Algorithm Popular-CHA on G ′′ . As illustration, if we run Algorithm Popular-CHA on the example in
Fig. 1 after edge removals through Algorithm Prune-WCHA, then Algorithm Popular-CHA will return the following matching
M = {(a1,h1), (a2,h3), (a3,h3), (a4,h5), (a5,h4), (a6,h4)} which may be veriﬁed to be popular.
Analysis of the algorithm for WCHA
Let us now consider the time taken to ﬁnd a popular matching or to report that no such matching exists, given an
instance of WCHA. First of all, it takes O (m) time to deﬁne the f - and s-houses, as discussed in Section 2. Let us then
consider the time complexity of Algorithm Prune-WCHA. It is clear that the subgraph G ′ can be constructed in O (m) time
and has O (n1) edges since each agent has degree 2 in G ′ . Clearly, in the ﬁrst stage of the algorithm, initialising λ(h j) for
each f -house takes O (n2) time. Next, we iterate over every agent a to deﬁne λmin(a, f (a)). In order to do so, we traverse
the preference list of a to ﬁnd the minimum cost of all PIPs among all houses that a prefers to f (a), if such houses exist.
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time for this is bounded by the total length of the preference lists. Hence, deﬁning λmin(a, f (a)) for every agent a takes
O (m) time overall.
In order to deﬁne λz(h j) (and hence λ(h j)) for each f -house h j , we need to iterate over every agent a such that
a ∈ f z(h j). Again, the time complexity for this is bounded by the total length of preference lists so that it takes O (m)
time overall to deﬁne λz(h j) (and hence λ(h j)) for each f -house and to remove those edges which cannot belong to any
popular matching (in lines 20 and 24–25 of the ﬁrst stage of the algorithm). By a similar argument, the second stage of
the algorithm also takes O (m) time so that Algorithm Prune-WCHA takes O (m) time overall. Now, it takes O (
√
Cn1 +m)
time, using Algorithm Popular-CHA, to ﬁnd a well-formed matching (if one exists) in G ′′ , where C is the total capacity of
the houses. It follows that we obtain the following results for the time complexity of ﬁnding a popular matching in WCHA.
Theorem 16. Let I be an instance of WCHA. Then, we can ﬁnd a popular matching in I , or determine that none exists, in O (
√
Cn1 +m)
time.
3.5. Finding a maximum popular matching
It remains to consider the problem of ﬁnding a maximum popular matching in WCHA. Let us run Algorithms Label-f and
Prune-WCHA as before to deﬁne f - and s-houses and to delete certain edges which cannot belong to any popular matching.
We then adopt a similar algorithm to that in [14] for the analogous problem in CHA as follows.
That is, let A1 be the set of all agents a with s(a) = l(a), and let A2 = A\A1. Our objective is to ﬁnd a well-formed
matching in G ′′ which minimises the number of A1-agents who are assigned to their last resort house. We let A′ denote
the set {a ∈⋃d jp=1 f p(h j): h j ∈ H}. We begin by carrying out a pre-processing step on G ′′ to compute a matching M0 that
assigns each agent in A′ to his f -house. We then try to ﬁnd a maximum matching M ′ in G ′′ that only involves the A2\A′-
agents and their incident edges. If M ′ is not an agent-complete matching of A2\A′-agents, then clearly I admits no popular
matching. Otherwise, we remove all edges in G ′′ that are incident to a last resort house, and try to assign additional A1\A′-
agents to their f -houses by repeatedly ﬁnding an augmenting path with respect to M ′ using Gabow’s algorithm [7] in a
similar approach to that for CHA in [14]. Let M ′′ be the matching obtained by augmenting M ′ . If any A1-agent remains
unassigned at the end of this step, we simply assign him to his last resort house, to obtain an agent-complete matching
of A\A′-agents in G ′′ . Let M = M0 ∪ M ′′ . If any agent a belonging to A\A′ is not assigned to his f -house h j but h j is
undersubscribed in M , we promote a from M(a) to h j , repeating this process as necessary. Then, clearly the matching M
obtained will be a well-formed matching in G ′′ , and hence popular by Lemma 13. It follows that M is a maximum popular
matching, giving the following theorem.
Theorem 17. Given an instance of WCHA, we can ﬁnd a maximum popular matching, or determine that none exists, in O (
√
Cn1 +m)
time.
3.6. “Cloning” versus our direct approach
A straightforward solution to ﬁnding a popular matching, given an instance I of WCHA, may be to use “cloning” to
create an instance J of WHAT, and then to apply the O (min(k
√
n,n)m) algorithm of [17] to J . Firstly, we create c j clones
h1j ,h
2
j , . . . ,h
c j
j of each house h j in I , where each clone has a capacity of 1. In addition, we replace each occurrence of h j
in a given agent’s preference list with the sequence h1j ,h
2
j , . . . ,h
c j
j , the elements of which are listed in a single tie at the
point where h j appears. Let G J denote the underlying graph of J . Then, G J contains n′ = n1 + C nodes. For each ai ∈ A,
let Ai denote the set of acceptable houses for ai , and let cmin = min{c j: h j ∈ H}. Then the number of edges in G J is m′ =∑
ai∈A
∑
h j∈Ai c j mcmin . Hence, the complexity of applying the algorithm of [17] to J is Ω(min(k
√
n1 + C,n1 + C)mcmin).
Now, the complexity of our algorithm may be rewritten as O (
√
Cn1) or O (m) depending on which component dominates
the running time. If n1 + C  k√n1 + C , then the cloning approach takes Ω(k√n1 + Cmcmin) time which is slower than our
algorithm by a factor of Ω(kcmin). Otherwise, if n1 + C < k√n1 + C , then the cloning approach takes Ω(mcmin(n1 + C)) time
which is slower than our algorithm by a factor of Ω(
√
n1 + Ccmin). It follows that the cloning method is slower than our
direct approach for all possible cases.
4. Open problem
We conclude with the following open problem. Suppose that we are presented with an instance J of WCHA in which
the preference lists of agents are allowed to contain ties, i.e., an instance of WCHAT. Is the problem of ﬁnding a popular
matching (or reporting that none exists) in J then solvable in polynomial time?
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